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I. INTRODUCTION
Questions: Can the newly appointed attorney-in-fact close
the principal's joint tenancy accounts and open a new ac-
count naming the attorney-in-fact as joint tenant with the
principal? Can the attorney-in-fact make gifts to himself
or herself from any of the principal's accounts even
though the principal never made such gifts before? Can
IRA beneficiary designations be changed by the attorney-
in-fact? Can a revocable trust be amended by the attor-
ney-in-fact?
Answers: I do not have the answers.1 I am simply trying to
find the answers as well. But it seems, put simply, the an-
swer is that the attorney-in-fact should do what any good
fiduciary would do. As everybody knows, a good fiduciary
will...
A power of attorney, in the context of estate planning and care
for the elderly or disabled, is a common tool to manage a person's
assets with administrative ease. In Minnesota, the power of attor-
ney may be created pursuant to the common law' or pursuant to
the Minnesota Statutory Short Form.3 The power of attorney cre-
ates a principal-agent relationship. 4 The principal-agent relation-
ship is often used because of its administrative ease. The extent of
the agent's power is generally determined by the document grant-
ing the power.' Since it is relatively simple for an agent, (hereinaf-
ter the "attorney-in-fact") to be created and to exercise its power, it
is also relatively simple for an attorney-in-fact to, knowingly or un-
knowingly, exceed his or her powers, particularly when the scope of
the attorney-in-fact's powers are not clearly defined. The lack of
clarity in this area raises the issue whether an attorney-in-fact may
use its powers (in particular the gifting power coupled with any
other power) to change a dispositive estate plan or embark on un-
bridled gifting of the principal's assets. Examples of changing a
dispositive estate plan include terminating a joint tenancy, chang-
ing beneficiary designations, changing payable on death provisions
1. Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent Under a Financial Durable Power of Attor-
ney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REv. 574 (1996).
2. MINN. STAT. § 523.02 (2000).
3. Id. The actual form is located at Minnesota Statute section 523.23.
4. Duluth News Tribune v. Smith, 169 Minn. 356, 358, 211 N.W. 322, 323
(1926).
5. Infra Part II.A-B.
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or altering documents such as a revocable trust.
Further frustrating the exercise of a power under a power of
attorney is the fact that the common law has traditionally restricted
the use of fiduciary powers to benefit the fiduciary or to change a
principal's declared intent, while the statutory power of attorney
does not clearly impose such limitations upon an attorney-in-fact's
powers. It is that gray area that requires review. To review this gray
area, I will first examine the forms of powers of attorney and the
standard of care required of an attorney-in-fact. I then review the
common law traditional prohibition of alter-egos by guardians and
conservators and how such policies may affect the attorney-in-fact.
With the assumption that the attorney-in-fact must abide by certain
standards of care in the shadow of guardianship/conservatorship
law, the analysis then turns to whether that standard of care limits
express or implied authority given an attorney-in-fact.
II. FORMS OF POWER OF ATTORNEY
The power of attorney in Minnesota usually takes one of two
forms: (1) the Common Law Power of Attorney, and (2) the Statu-
tory Short Form Power of Attorney.
A. Common Law Power Of Attorney
With the advent of the statutory short form power of attorney,
the common law power of attorney might well be defined as "an in-
strument in writing by which one person appoints another as his
agent and confers on him authority to perform certain specified
acts on behalf of the principal and such writing does not satisfy
the formal requirements of a statutory short form power of attor-
ney.' A power of attorney is generally created by agreement (as
opposed to a contract) between the principal and the agent.8 The
common law power of attorney should name an attorney-in-fact, be
dated, signed by the principal and have the principal's signature
acknowledged. 9 The powers given the attorney-in-fact are limited
to those expressly granted in the document 0 and may include or
6. 2 MINN. DUNNELL'S DIG. § 2.05 (4th ed. 1989) (citing Duluth News Trib-
une v. Smith, 169 Minn. 356, 211 N.W. 322 (1926)).
7. MINN. STAT. § 523.23, subd. 3 (2000).
8. 2 MINN. DUNNELL'S DIG. § 1.01a.
9. Cox v. Manvel, 50 Minn. 87, 90, 52 N.W. 273,273 (1892).
10. Duluth News Tribune, 169 Minn. at 357, 211 N.W. at 322.
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refer to the powers granted in Minnesota Statute section 523.24.
Thus the common law power of attorney is an agreement under the
common law of agency, and is shadowed by the provisions granted
by the power of attorney provisions contained in Minnesota Stat-
utes section 523 et. seq.
B. Statutory Short Form Power Of Attorney
The statutory short form power of attorney can act as a power
of attorney per se if it satisfies the strict formalities contained in
Minnesota Statutes section 523 et. seq. The statutory form is con-
tained in Minnesota Statutes section 523.23. To qualify as a statu-
tory short form power of attorney "the wording and content of the
form in subdivision 1 must be duplicated exactly and with no modi-
fications, parts First, Second, and Third must be properly com-
pleted, and the signature of the principal must be acknowledged."'"
A copy of the statutory short form power of attorney is in Appendix
A herein. If these requirements are not met, the statutory power of
attorney may still operate as a common law power of attorney."
However, any party refusing to accept the authority of an attorney-
in-fact under such a common law power of attorney shall not be
held liable for such refusal under Minnesota Statutes section
523.20.13
III. STANDARD OF CARE OF THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
An attorney-in-fact must exercise a statutory standard of care
(if the statute is referenced or the statutory form is used) and a fi-
duciary standard of care for the benefit of the principal.
A. Statutory Standard Of Care
While the attorney-in-fact has no affirmative duty to exercise
any power conferred upon the attorney-in-fact, 14 if such power is
exercised, "the attorney-in-fact shall exercise the power in the same
manner as an ordinarily prudent person of discretion and intelli-
gence would exercise in the management of the person's own af-
fairs and shall have the interests of the principal utmost in mind."
15
11. MINN. STAT. § 523.23, subd. 3 (2000).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Supra note 11, at § 523.21.
15. Id. See also Witt v. John Blomquist, Inc., 249 Minn. 32, 34, 81 N.W.2d 265,
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Among other duties, the attorney-in-fact must keep complete re-
cords of all transactions entered into by the attorney-in-fact on be-
half of the principal,16 and shall provide an accounting to the prin-. 17
cipal when requested. The attorney-in-fact is authorized to
reimburse himself or herself for expenditures made on behalf of
the principal, even if the power of attorney does not grant the at-
torney-in-fact the right to make transfers to himself or herself in
Part Third of the document, but the attorney-in-fact must provide
an accounting for such expenditures. 8
B. Fiduciary Standard Of Care
An agency is the fiduciary relation that results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf.. .There is an agency rela-
tionship only if there is an understanding between the
parties that creates a fiduciary relation in which the fidu-
ciary is subject to the directions of the one on whose ac-
count he acts.19
The attorney-in-fact's standard of care is a fiduciary standard
because of the agency relationship between the attorney-in-fact and
the principal. A fiduciary is bound by common law principles and
by statute (discussed above) when acting pursuant to a power of at-
torney to act in the best interests of the principal. The common
law principles include, but are not limited to, the duty of loalty21 to
the principal, and the duty to not engage in self-dealing. These
same fiduciary concepts are mirrored by the fiduciary duties owed
13by a trustee to trust beneficiaries.
Whether the power of attorney is valid under the common law
or by statute, there is clearly a standard of care required of the at-
torney-in-fact. It is relatively easy to argue that when the attorney-
266 (1957) (discussing a realty agent's duty to exercise reasonable care); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1994).
16. MINN. STAT. § 523.21 (2000).
17. Id.
18. Id. at § 523.23, subd. 4 (2000).
19. 2 DUNNELL'SMINN. DIG. § 1.0.
20. Younggren v. Younggren, 556 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
21. Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 131-32, 94 N.W.2d
273, 281 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 387 (1994).
22. Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Sur Co. of N.Y., 207 Minn. 117,
124, 290 N.W. 231, 235 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 389 (1994).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS §§ 170, 174 (1986-1999 Supp.).
2000] 1147
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in-fact exercises its power over property titled in the name of the
principal alone for the sole benefit of the principal that there has
been no breach of the attorney-in-fact's duty to the principal. What
is problematic is when the exercise of the attorney-in-fact's power
affects or effects a third person as well as the principal. What is also
at issue is whether the attorney-in-fact has the actual authority to
change benefits of third persons that were created by the principal,
and whether the attorney-in-fact may personally benefit, directly or
indirectly, from its acts. The attorney-in-fact therefore needs some
form of substantive law to deviate from the traditional common law
limitations upon a fiduciary.
IV. PROHIBITION OF ALTER-EGOS AND THE POWER To ALTER PRIOR
DISPOSITIVE PLANS
In guardianship/conservatorship law, it is a well established
principle that the guardian or conservator is not to assume the alter
ego of the ward or conservatee.24 Based upon that principle, it has
been settled law that the guardian or conservator does not have au-
thority to alter a dispositive plan that existed before a person be-
came incompetent because to alter the plan, for example by chang-
ing beneficiary designations or severing joint tenancies, would be
25to assume an alter-ego of the ward or conservatee. Yet fiduciaries
are often confronted with the fact that there are sound tax reasons,
and practical reasons, to change a person's dispositive plan. The
fiduciary must then seek some form of authority to alter the dispo-
sitive plan. An often argued authority for such acts is the Substi-
tutedJudgment Doctrine.
A. Substituted Judgment Doctrine
The concept of Substituted Judgment is that the fiduciary does
what the principal could have done, or would have done, had the
principal been competent. This doctrine is often used to justify es-
tate tax planning, medical assistance planning, and health care
management issues.26 The doctrine has not been recognized in
24. In reEstate of Kroyer, 385 N.W.2d 31, 33-34 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Hagen
v. Rekow, 253 Minn. 341, 346; 91 N.W.2d 768, 771 (1958).
25. Kroyer, 385 N.W.2d at 33-34; Hagen, 91 N.W.2d at 346.
26. SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT: ESTATE AND MEDICAID PLANNING BY GUARDIANS, 13
Prob. & Prop. Uanuary/February 1999); COMPELLED MEDICAL PROCEDURES INVOLV-
ING MINORS AND INCOMPETENTS AND MISAPPLICATION OF THE SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT
DocrRIuN,JOURNAL OF HEALTH AND MEDICINE, Vol. 7: pp. 107-130 (1992).
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Minnesota. The problem with application of the Substituted
Judgment Doctrine is that if the principal did not engage in such
planning before becoming incompetent, then there is no level of
certainty that the principal would consent to the planning if the
principal had been competent. Additionally, such planning usually
only benefits third parties and does not directly benefit the princi-
pal. If the fiduciary is to manage assets for the benefit of the prin-
cipal (as is the duty of a guardian or conservator), then planning to
reduce estate taxes has no relevance to a principal because the
principal receives no real benefit from such planning.
Additionally, before the fiduciary can validly exercise the
power of substituted judgment for tax (or other) purposes in a
manner that clearly provides a primary benefit to third persons,
there must be some basis in law authorizing the fiduciary make the
27transfers. In Minnesota, there appears to be no substantive law
authorizing the application of the Substituted Judgment Doctrine.
B. Common Law Powers
Minnesota case law has consistently held that the guardian, ab-
sent court approval, does not have the right to remove joint tenant
names or survivor names on certificates of deposit (or totten trusts)
after the donor became incompetent.2" The rationale for this rule
is that the guardian does not become the alter ego of the incompe-
tent and therefore the guardian lacks authority, absent a court or-
der, to alter personal decisions made by the ward when the ward
29had mental capacity.
Despite the long standing precedent of the rule against chang-
ing dispositive language, the court decided in the case of In Re Con-
servatorship of Gobernatz,3° that a guardian may change a joint ten-
ancy account that existed before appointment of a guardian. In
this case, Dardanella Luke was the friend and caregiver for Mr.
Gobernatz for approximately 12 years. On September 7, 1990, Mr.
Gobernatz opened a certificate of deposit listing himself and Ms.
Luke as joint tenants. In the summer of 1997, Mr. Gobernatz be-
came ill and special conservators for Mr. Gobernatz's person and
estate were appointed. The conservators provided proof of their
27. C.I.R. v. Bosch's Estate, 387 U.S. 456, 458 (1967).
28. Supra note 24.
29. Kroyer, 385 N.W.2d at 33-34; Hagen, 91 N.W.2d at 768-769.
30. 603 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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appointment and written instruction to the bank and the bank
changed title to the certificate of deposit to the name of the con-
servators as such. Mr. Gobernatz died on September 2, 1997. The
conservators demanded the certificate of deposit and Ms. Luke re-
fused. She cashed in the certificate and the conservators sued for
recovery of the funds.
The court reviewed Minnesota Statutes section 524.6-205
which provides that ajoint account may be changed "by written or-
der given by a party to the financial institution to change the form
of the account." The court went on to reason that since Minnesota
Statutes section 524.6-201 subdivision 8 includes a guardian in the
definition of "party" then a guardian may change a joint account.
The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the guard-
ian does not have such power under the guardianship statutes and
despite the fact that common law has held that the guardian does
not have the power to change such accounts. Apparently the court
imputed this power upon the guardian because of the statutory
provisions of Minnesota Statute section 524.6-201 subdivision 8.
The court in Gobernatz noted in footnote 1 of its decision that
"[c]ase law before 1973 that based conclusions regarding joint ten-
ancy accounts on the theory of joint tenancy with right of survivor-
ship is no longer persuasive. .. , ,31 While that statement seems to in-
fer that the Gobernatz decision may be intended to overrule
precedent on this issue, several questions remain unanswered. For
example, is the 1986 Kroyer case still valid precedent (since it was
decided after 1973) or was it not known to the Gobernatz court?
Also, is the reasoning in Gobernatz limited to joint tenancy certifi-
cates of deposit, or is the rationale that the guardian shall not be
the alter ego of the ward overruled and the guardian may re-title
other forms of a ward's assets and beneficiary designations?
It seems the Gobernatz court believed that Minnesota Statute
section 524.6-205 provides that a power is imputed upon a guardian
to change a joint account because such acts by a guardian are con-
templated in the multi-party account statute despite precedent that
restricts such activity. If this is the case, then by closely related
analogy, if an attorney-in-fact is specifically granted the power to
transfer property to himself or herself or to engage in banking
transactions (or other transactions), may the attorney-in-fact be-
come the alter-ego of the principal and change dispositive asset
31. Id. at 360 (citation omitted).
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provisions of the principal?
In the case of In re Groedel's Estate,32 the Surrogate's Court
stated:
[u] nder the statutory form, the authorization to represent
[Mr. Groedel] in 'all other matters' must be construed to
mean 'that the principal authorizes the agent to act as an
alter ego of the principal with respect to any and all possi-
ble matters and affairs which are not enumerated' in [the
New York Statutes] .
Thus, at least in New York in 1960, the Surrogate's Court be-
lieved that an attorney-in-fact could act as the alter-ego of the prin-
cipal because the attorney-in-fact was given authority to act in "all
other matters."
There is simply no substantive guidance whether the statutory
power of attorney has changed the common law regarding chang-
ing dispositive plans or whether the statutory power of attorney
should be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Thus, we must look to
the specific language of the power of attorney statute for guidance
to determine the scope of the attorney-in-fact's authority.
V. POWERS OF THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
The authority granted to an attorney-in-fact must be expressly
stated in the power of attorney document3 4 and the provisions of
the power of attorney are strictly construed to carry out the intent
of the principal and agent.' "The general rules concerning the
construction of instruments are applicable. " 6 Minnesota Statutes
section 523, however, provides for specific reference to attorney-in-
fact powers that may be granted by the statutory short form, or in-
corporated into the common law power of attorney by reference
7
or specifically listed in the common law power of attorney. The
statute goes on to provide the construction of the specific powers
granted in Part First of the statutory power of attorney form. De-
spite the specific enumeration of powers in Minnesota Statute sec-
32. 203 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1960).
33. Id. at 590.
34. Duluth News Tribune v. Smith, 169 Minn. 356, 357, 211 N.W. 322, 322
(1926).
35. Id.
36. 2 DUNNELL'S MINN. DIG. § 2.05 (citing Carson v. Smith, 5 Minn. 78
(1860)).
37. MINN. STAT. § 523.23, subd. 3 (2000).
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tion 523, there continues to be ambiguity regarding the extent by
which such powers may be exercised by the attorney-in-fact if the
exercise of such power is in conflict with the attorney-in-fact's fidu-
ciary duties to the principal, or conflicts with a potential prohibi-
tion of alteration of dispositive provisions. In particular, the ques-
tion whether the attorney-in-fact may exercise powers that benefit
the attorney-in-fact, directly or indirectly, or if the attorney-in-fact
can change the principal's testamentary plan that is in place at the
time the power of attorney can be exercised, are recurring issues
for an attorney-in-fact. Powers that typically affect such issues are
the power over banking transactions, the power over insurance
contracts, and the power over beneficiary transactions. Each of
theses powers might be used in conjunction with the power to gift.
Therefore, what is most often at issue is the extent of the gifting
power used in conjunction with other powers under the power of
38
attorney statute.
A. Power To Amend A Revocable Trust Or Create A Will
I have often been told that a statutory power of attorney grants
the power over "contracts." It is then argued that since a revocable
trust is a "contract"3 9 then the attorney-in-fact may amend the trust.
The statutory power of attorney does provide power over "business"
contracts. 40 A revocable trust, arguably, is not a business. Thus
there does not appear to be direct authority in the statutory powers
for an attorney-in-fact to execute changes to a principal's revocable
trust. Yet assuming such a power exists, there is no direct authority
to allow the attorney-in-fact the power to change a dispositive plan
except pursuant to the gifting power discussed below. On the
other hand, I have not found any real authority that limits a princi-
pal's ability to delegate the power to create a Will or revocable
41
trust.
38. Although a common law power of attorney may separately define such
powers, for purposes of consistency, it is assumed for this analysis that the com-
mon law power and the statutory power granted the attorney-in-fact are the same.
39. A revocable trust may also be an agreement, which is distinguishable from
a contract; a revocable trust may also be a declaration of trust which is distinguish-
able from a contract.
40. MINN. STAT. § 523.24, subd. 5(3) (a).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.5 (1990),
cmt. on subsection 3. The comments provide no substantive support for the
proposition that a person cannot delegate the power to make a Will. Id.
1152 [Vol. 27:2
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B. Power Of Banking Transactions
Minnesota Statute section 523.24, subd. 4 provides the attor-
ney-in-fact the power to perform banking transactions for the bene-
fit of the principal. Nothing in this provision provides that the at-
torney-in-fact may withdraw funds for the attorney-in-fact's personal
benefit, nor does the statute expressly provide that the attorney-in-
fact may convert an account to a joint account or payable-on-death
account for the personal benefit of the attorney-in-fact. The attor-
ney-in-fact may be tempted to follow the reasoning of the Gobernatz
decision and argue that if the attorney-in-fact is given the power
over banking transactions then that infers the power over all parts
of banking including changing dispositive provisions. But if the at-
torney-in-fact exercises its required standard of care, the change in
dispositive provisions of bank accounts (i.e., terminate joint ten-
ancy, change P.O.D. provisions, etc.) must be for the benefit of the
principal and not a third person. Also, a change depriving a bene-
ficiary of an account must be for the principal's benefit. Absent a
showing of a benefit to the principal, it seems the dispositive provi-
sions of bank accounts may be changed only pursuant to the bank-
ing power exercised in conjunction with the gifting power, but
then only if the gifting power allows such a change. But again,
there is no guidance whether these powers, individually or to-
gether, are to be interpreted broadly or narrowly.
C. Power Of Insurance Transactions
Minnesota Statutes section 523.24, subd. 6 provides that the at-
torney-in-fact may exercise transactions related to insurance on be-
half of the principal. In particular, paragraph (2) of this provision
provides:
[T]he attorney-in-fact [may]designate the beneficiary of
the [insurance] contract, provided, however, that the at-
torney-in-fact cannot be named a beneficiary except, if
permitted under subdivision 8 [the gifting power], the at-
torney-in-fact can be named the beneficiary of death
benefit proceeds under an insurance contract, or, if the
attorney-in-fact was named as a beneficiary under the con-
tract which was procured by the principal prior to the
granting of the power of attorney, then the attorney-in-
fact can continue to be named as the beneficiary....
42. Supra note 40, at § 523.24, subd. 6(2).
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The statute clearly contemplates the fact that the attorney-in-
fact may purchase life insurance and may designate the beneficiary
of such insurance, but the statute limits the attorney-in-fact's ability
to personally benefit from the insurance to the limitations of the
gifting power. Interestingly, however, is the fact that there is no
statutory prohibition for the attorney-in-fact to name his or her
spouse, children, or other related parties as beneficiary of an insur-
43
ance contract. Thus the statute seems to infer that the attorney-
in-fact may change dispositive provisions related to insurance al-
ready established by the principal, and only a designation naming
the attorney-in-fact as beneficiary requires the use of the gifting
provision. This provides an initial view that the powers granted
under the power of attorney statute may be used to change disposi-
tive language and may be used for the benefit of the attorney-in-
fact unless such acts are limited by the statute. This is also the only
language in the statute that limits the exercise of the power of at-
torney as it relates to changing dispositive provisions and gifting.
D. Power Of Beneficiary Transactions
Minnesota Statute section 523.24, subd. 7 provides the attor-
ney-in-fact power
to represent and act for the principal in all ways and in all
matters affecting any trust, probate estate, guardianship,
conservatorship, escrow, custodianship, qualified benefit
plan, nonqualified benefit plan, individual retirement as-
set, or other fund out of which the principal is entitled, or
claims to be entitled, as a beneficiary or participant, to
some share or payment, including, but not limited to the
following:4... (e) to execute, acknowledge, verify, seal, file,
and deliver any deed, assignment, mortgage, lease, con-
sent, designation .... or other instrument which the attorney-
in-fact deems useful for the accomplishment of any of the
purposes enumerated in this subdivision.
It is common for a principal to possess the power to designate
an alternate beneficiary for property to which the principal is the
primary beneficiary. It appears that this statutory provision pro-
vides the attorney-in-fact broad powers over the designated benefi-
ciary assets and that such power may include the power to change a
43. Id. at subd. 6(1).
44. Id. at subd. 7(1) (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 7(1) (e) (emphasis added).
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beneficiary designation already in place. Also, if the interpretation
of the phrase "all other matters" in the Groedet 6 case is applied to
the Minnesota statute, the attorney-in-fact's power "in all ways and
in all matters" might be interpreted to mean that the attorney-in-
fact may become the alter-ego of the principal in defiance of the
Minnesota common law resistance to such actions. Regardless of
how broadly the beneficiary power is interpreted, the attorney-in-
fact must exercise its power for the benefit of the principal. 47 The
attorney-in-fact must then have reasons to change beneficiary des-
ignations. Of course, the first reason may be to make gifts. If the
attorney-in-fact interprets this provision as broadly as the insurance
provision might be interpreted, then the attorney-in-fact may deem
it reasonable that the principal's desire to make gifts is more im-
portant than the principal's interest in retaining a dispositive plan.
Alternatively, in the case of retirement account planning, for
example, there may be tax benefits to changing beneficiary desig-
nations. By changing the distribution options regarding recalculat-
ing life expectancies the principal may receive tax benefits by
slowing the rate of distributions. However, if beneficiary designa-
tions are changed to provide optimal tax planning for the principal
and a beneficiary, that raises the question whether the change is ac-
tually for the benefit of the principal, or for the benefit of the prin-
cipal and the beneficiary. As stated earlier, the attorney-in-fact
must act with the best interests of the principal in mind and may
not benefit from his position as attorney-in-fact without the full
knowledge and consent of the principal.49 If the attorney-in-fact
benefits directly or indirectly with the decision to change a benefi-
ciary designation, then the attorney-in-fact may be violating its duty
of loyalty to the principal, even if the change also benefits the prin-
cipal. Thus, the power to change beneficiary designations may also
need to rely upon the gifting powers if the attorney-in-fact is to
benefit from the exercise of this power, even if the exercise pro-
vides a direct benefit to the principal.
E. Power To Gift Minnesota Statutes Section 523.24
Minnesota Statutes section 523.24, subd. 8 elaborates on the
46. In reGroedel's Estate, 203 N.Y.S.2d 587, 590 (1960).
47. MINN. STAT. § 523.21 (2000).
48. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a) (9)-i(f) Q&AE-5, E-6, E-7, E-8.
49. Supra Part III.
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power to gift that the principal may delegate to the attorney-in-fact.
It seems that many of the powers given an attorney-in-fact may be
used in conjunction with the power to gift. Under this provision,
the attorney-in-fact may make gifts on behalf of the principal to the
following:
[T] o an organization, whether charitable or otherwise, to
which the principal has made gifts;
50
[T]o satisfy pledges made to an organization by the prin-
cipal 5' and
[T]o the principal's spouse, descendants, spouse's de-
scendants, and to the attorney in fact provided the
amount does not exceed 10,000 per recipient, per year."
The gifting provision provides that the attorney-in-fact may
make gifts for reasons "the attorney-in-fact deems to be in the best
interest of the principal, specifically including the minimization of in-
come, estate, inheritance or gift taxes. 53 The principal may also author-
ize the attorney-in-fact to make gifts to himself or herself.54 This
language in the gifting powers is of particular importance because,
unlike traditional guardianship and conservatorship principles, the
statute specifically acknowledges that gifts may be made for reasons
other than a direct benefit to the principal, and the fiduciary is ap-
parently authorized to make gifts to himself or herself.
It seems, then, that the attorney-in-fact must still address at
least three additional questions when making a gift:
(1) Is the power to gift absolute, or is it subject to a standard
of care?
(2) Is the power to make gifts limited to gifting property that
the principal possessed in his or her sole name, or does the power
to make gifts include making gifts from property subject to disposi-
tive language, such as from ajoint tenancy account?
50. MINN. STAT. § 523.24 subd. 8 (1) (2000).
51. Id.
52. Id. at subd. 8(2). The purpose of limiting gifts the attorney-in-fact may
make for the principal to $10,000 per year to himself or herself or to any person
the attorney-in-fact has a legal obligation to support, is for federal estate and gift
tax reasons. If the power to make such gifts exceeded $10,000 per year, the attor-
ney-in-fact could be deemed to have a power of appointment over the principal's
property (or a portion thereof). Such power of appointment would cause the at-
torney-in-fact to be liable for the gift tax on the transfer of such property, or the
property may be subject to estate tax in the attorney-in-fact's estate. I.R.C. §§ 2514,
2041.
53. MINN. STAT. § 523.24 subd. 8(2) (emphasis added).
54. Id.
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(3) Is the attorney-in-fact immune from any breach of duty of
loyalty or failure to avoid self-dealing if the power of attorney
specifically provides the attorney-in-fact the right to gift to himself
or herself?
(1) Is the power to gift absolute, or is it subject to a standard
of care?
Although a gift may be made for reasons "the attorney-in-fact
deems to be in the best interest of the principal ,55 the gifting power
does not negate the fact that the attorney-in-fact is still under a
statutory duty to "exercise the power [to gift] in the same manner
as an ordinarily prudent person of discretion and intelligence
would exercise in the management of the person's own affairs and
shall have the interests of the principal utmost in mind. ,56 Also,
under the common law fiduciary principles of loyalty and no self-
dealing, the attorney-in-fact must act with the best interests of the
principal in mind and may not benefit from his position as attor-
ney-in-fact without the full knowledge and consent of the princi-
pal.P Therefore, unless the standard of care is eliminated, the
power to gift is not absolute and is subject to a standard of care.
(2) Is the power to make gifts limited to gifting property that
the principal possessed in his or her sole name, or does the power
to make gifts include making gifts from property subject to disposi-
tive language, such as from ajoint tenancy account?
Despite the gifting provision's specific grant of authority to
make gifts for tax reasons, such provision, unlike the statute cited
in the Gobernatz case, does not give the attorney-in-fact specific au-
thority to change dispositive language, thus the Gobernatz decision
is reasonably distinguishable.
There does not appear to be any direct authority for the
proposition that an attorney-in-fact may make gifts from assets sub-
ject to dispositive language such asjoint tenancy accounts. On the
other hand, the power given an attorney-in-fact over insurance
transactions, for example, specifically limits the attorney-in-fact's
power to name himself or herself as a beneficiary of new insurance,
but it does allow such an act if authorized by the gifting powers58
and does not appear to limit such acts for the benefit of anyone
55. Id.
56. MINN. STAT. § 523.21 (emphasis added).
57. Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 131-32, 94 N.W.2d
273, 281 (1959).
58. Supra note 56 at § 523.24, subd.6.
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other than the attorney-in-fact. Therefore it seems the statutory
powers of gifting and insurance contracts, acting in concert, may
change dispositive provisions for the benefit of an attorney-in-fact
and others. If this same reasoning is applied to the banking power
and beneficiary transactions power, then it seems that attorney-in-
fact has substantial authority to change prior dispositive provisions,
but such powers are not specifically listed in the banking power or
the beneficiary power. There are two reasonable inferences from
such statutory silence. The statutory silence assumes the attorney-
in-fact may exercise such powers to his or her benefit, or the statu-
tory silence assumes the attorney-in-fact may not benefit from such
power. The insurance power provides the only tangible guidance
that the statutory silence infers broad application of the power. Yet
when the attorney-in-fact considers the fiduciary responsibilities of
its office, he or she should feel compelled to restrain the broad use
of the power.
It seems that if actual authority exists to gift from assets subject
to dispositive provisions established by the principal (other than in-
surance transactions), the authority comes from, and must rest
squarely upon, the attorney-in-fact's judgment that gifts from such
accounts are in the best interest of the principal,5 " despite the prin-
cipal's prior acts and the principles of known guardian-
ship/conservatorship common law.6° Thus it seems the fiduciary
discretion of the attorney-in-fact is the most direct authority to
change prior dispositive provisions. Whether the attorney-in-fact
can ever make such ajudgment is not known.
(3)Is the attorney-in-fact immune from any breach of duty of
loyalty or failure to avoid self-dealing if the power of attorney spe-
cifically provides the attorney-in-fact the right to gift to himself or
herself?
Whether the attorney-in-fact makes gifts from assets subject to
dispositive provisions or not, the attorney-in-fact must make the
gifts based upon his or her judgment that the gift is in the best in-
61
terest of the principal.
A power of attorney, however, may be drafted to be durable.
That means the attorney-in-fact may continue to exercise the power
of attorney after the principal is incapacitated or incompetent.62 If
59. Id. atsubd. 8(2).
60. Supra, Prohibition of Alter-Ego discussion.
61. MINN. STAT. § 523.24, subd. 8(2).
62. Id. § 523.07; see also Minnesota Statutes section 523.03 for the definition of
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the principal is incapacitated or incompetent, that may render the
principal incapable of either giving consent to a gift or acquiring
full knowledge of the proposed gift thereby relieving the attorney-
in-fact of its common law breach of duty (assuming for the moment
that the specific authority to transfer property to the attorney-in-
fact is not granted). If the attorney-in-fact cannot acquire the pre-
requisite common law relief for breach of duty of loyalty or self-
dealing because the principal is incompetent or incapacitated, then
the issue is whether the attorney-in-fact's specific authority to make
gifts to himself or herself is a per se waiver and/or consent to a
breach of fiduciary duty by the attorney-in-fact.
63In the case of Schock v. Nash, the court was reviewing several
gift transfers made by the attorney-in-fact to herself and her family
members. The court started from the proposition that "[t] he crea-
tion of a power of attorney imposes the fiduciary duty of loyalty on
the attorney-in-fact." 64 The court held that the duty of loyalty of an
agent is similar to the duty of loyalty of a trustee and that such trust
65concepts were therefore applicable. The court went on to con-
clude that the creation of a durable power of attorney that does not
expressly provide for gratuitous transfers does not waive the duty of• 66
loyalty for the attorney-in-fact. This begs the question whether the
Delaware court would find that if a durable power of attorney spe-
cifically provides for gifting by the attorney-in-fact, then the fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty is presumed waived. Such a holding may seem
consistent with the trust principle that a breach of duty of loyalty
67may consented to by the beneficiary of a trust, i.e., the principal.
If the principal provides the attorney-in-fact specific authority
to make gifts to the attorney-in-fact, it would seem that the princi-
pal is consenting to the per se breach of loyalty and acts of self-
dealing by the attorney-in-fact. The attorney-in-fact may also argue
that such duties are not breached because of the rule of construc-
tion that "[w]here the language used [in the power of attorney] is
not ambiguous, its literal scope cannot be restricted by parol evi-
dence as to the reasons that motivated the maker to execute the in-
strument. ' 68 If the power of attorney allows for gifts to the attorney-
"incapacity" and "incompetency."
63. 732 A.2d 217 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999)
64. Id. at 224.
65. Id. at 225.
66. Id. at 226.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170.
68. Rheinberger v. First Nat'l Bank, 276 Minn. 194, 199, 150 N.W.2d 37, 41
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in-fact then statutory construction may absolve the attorney-in-fact
from the duty of loyalty and self-dealing for such gifts.
However, the grant of a power is not clearly a consent to each
and every exercise of the power. If there is a presumption that all
gifts made by an attorney-in-fact while the principal is competent
are valid, then all gifts made by an attorney-in-fact while the princi-
pal is incompetent would appear to also be valid. But the attorney-
in-fact is obligated to exercise its fiduciary duty when the principal
is competent, even if the attorney-in-fact is specifically authorized
to make gifts (including to himself or herself),69 therefore it would
follow that the attorney-in-fact is also subject to a fiduciary duty
when the principal is incompetent.
If the attorney-in-fact is still subject to a standard of care when
making gifts then it must follow that the attorney-in-fact can breach
that standard of care. If the attorney-in-fact breaches the standard
of care, then the principal may either consent to the gift, or compel
the attorney-in-fact to remedy the breach."' It seems, therefore,
that a specific grant of a power to gift does not equate to a pre-
approval of each and every gift made by an attorney-in-fact, al-
though the duty of loyalty and to avoid self dealing might be waived
if the attorney-in-fact is given authority to transfer property to the
attorney-in-fact.
The case law in Minnesota is sparse on the effect of the statu-
tory short form power of attorney. In the case of Younggren v.
Younggren,7' the attorneys-in-fact transferred money from the prin-
cipal's liquid assets into an account in their own names. The attor-
ney's-in-fact also transferred the principal's land to themselves re-
taining a life estate in the principal. The principal revoked the
power of attorney. The (now former) attorney's-in-fact then used
the cash they had transferred to themselves to pay down out-
standing debt on the transferred land. The trial court found that
the attorneys-in-fact acted properly in their role as such, but used
the transferred cash for their own benefit and must return the cash
used to pay down the debt.7' The court affirmed that the attorney-
in-fact shall exercise its power "in the same manner as an ordinarily
(1967) (emphasis added); see also Bache & Co. Inc. v. Wahlgren, 235 N.W.2d 839,
841 (Minn. 1975) (citing Rheinberber v. First Nat'l Bank, 276 Minn. 194, 199, 150
N.W.2d 37, 41 (1967)).
69. Supra Parts II.A-B, III.A-B.
70. Id.
71. 556 N.W.2d 228 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
72. Id. at 232.
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prudent person of discretion and intelligence would exercise in the
management of the person's own affairs and shall have the interests
of the principal utmost in mind."73 With that standard established,
the court believed the money transferred to the attorneys-in-fact
was still to be held for the benefit of the principal even though the
power of attorney was revoked. The payment of the debt on the
land only benefited the remaindermen, i.e., the attorneys-in-fact,
and therefore provided no benefit to the principal. Therefore the
funds had to be paid back. 4
Although the Younggren court did not categorize the transfers
made by the attorneys-in-fact as gifts, it did find that when the at-
torneys-in-fact make transfers to themselves that the transfers must
be made for the benefit of the principal in accordance with the ap-
plicable standard of care despite the specific authority in the power
of attorney to transfer funds to themselves.
The Younggren case does not give an attorney-in-fact much in-
struction on the attorney-in-fact's duties when making a gift. While
the power of attorney may clearly grant the power to gift, there
does not appear to be any authority for the proposition that gifts
are no longer subject to a fiduciary standard of care, although con-
cern regarding a breach of the duties of loyalty and to avoid self-
dealing seem to be minimalized. Although the gifts may be made
for reasons that do not specifically benefit the principal, such as for
tax reasons,7 5 the attorney-in-fact is not relieved of its duty of care.
V. CONCLUSION
The attorney-in-fact is a fiduciary subject to statutory and/or
common law duties and standard of care. The attorney-in-fact does
not have clear guidance or authority to change any dispositive pro-
visions established by the principal. The case law has historically
restricted such acts by fiduciaries, but the broad powers granted by
the power of attorney statute leaves this area in conflict and prob-
lematic. At the very least, it does not seem that a broad or liberal
use of the powers granted by a power of attorney is unwarranted.
However, when exercising the powers the attorney-in-fact remains
subject to a fiduciary standard of care. If the attorney-in-fact is
given the power to gift to himself or herself that (quite probably)
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. MINN. STAT. § 523.24 subd. 8.
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VII. APPENDIX
523.23 STATUTORY SHORT FORM OF GENERAL POWER OF
A-TORNEY; FORMAL REQUIREMENTS; JOINT AGENTS.
Subdivision 1. FORM. The following form may be used
to create a power of attorney, and, when used, it must be
construed in accordance with sections 523.23 and 523.24:
STATUTORY SHORT FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY
MINNESOTA STATUTES, SECTION 523.23
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The powers granted by this document
are broad and sweeping. They are defined in Minnesota Stat-
utes, section 523.24. If you have any questions about these
powers, obtain competent advice. This power of attorney may
be revoked by you if you wish to do so. This power of attorney
is automatically terminated if it is to your spouse and proceed-
ings are commenced for dissolution, legal separation, or an-
nulment of your marriage. This power of attorney authorizes,
but does not require, the attorney-in-fact to act for you.
PRINCIPAL (Name and Address of Person Granting the
Power)
ATTORNEYS (S)-IN-FACT SUCCESSOR ATTORNEY(S)-IN-FACT
(Name and Address) (Optional) To act if any named
attorney-in-fact dies, resigns,
or is otherwise unable to serve.
(Name and Address)
First Successor
Second Successor
2000] 1163
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NOTICE: If more than one
attorney-in-fact is designated,
make a check or "x" on the
line in front of one of the
following statements:
Each attorney-in-fact EXPIRATION DATE (Optional)
may independently exercise
the powers granted.
Use Specific Month Day Year
Only
-All attorneys-in-fact
mustjointly exercise the
powers granted.
I, (the above-named Principal) hereby appoint the above
named Attorney(s)-in-Fact to act as my attorney(s)-in-fact:
FIRST: To act for me in any way that I could act with
respect to the following matters, as each of them is defined in
Minnesota Statutes, section 523.24:
(To grant to the attorney-in-fact any of the following
powers, make a check or "x" on the line in front of each power
being granted. You may, but need not, cross out each power
not granted. Failure to make a check or "x" on the line in
front of the power will have the effect of deleting the power
unless the line in front of the power of (N) is checked or x-
ed.)
Check or "x"
_(A) real property transactions;
I choose to limit this power to real property in
County, Minnesota, described as follows:
(Use legal description. Do not use street address.)
(If more space is needed, continue on the back or on an
attachment.)
1164 [Vol. 27:2
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_(B) tangible personal property transactions;
_(C) bond, share, and commodity transactions;
(D) banking transactions;
_ (E) business operating transactions;
_ (F) insurance transactions;
(G) beneficiary transactions;
(H) gift transactions;
-(I) fiduciary transactions;
_J) claims and litigation;
(K) family maintenance;
(L) benefits from military service;
_(M) records, reports, and statements;
(N) all of the powers listed in (A) through (M) above
and all other matters.
SECOND: (You must indicate below whether or not this power
of attorney will be effective if you become incapacitated or
incompetent. Make a check or "x" on the line in front of the
statement that expresses your intent.)
_ This power of attorney shall continue to be effective
if I become incapacitated or incompetent.
__This power of attorney shall not be effective if I
become incapacitated or incompetent.
THIRD: (You must indicate below whether or not this power
of attorney authorizes the attorney-in-fact to transfer your
property to the attorney-in-fact. Make a check or "x" on the
line in front of the statement that expresses your intent.)
___This power of attorney authorizes the attorney-in-fact to
transfer my property to the attorney-in-fact.
_This power of attorney does not authorize the
attorney-in-fact to transfer my property to the
attorney-in-fact.
FOURTH: (You may indicate below whether or not the
attorney-in-fact is required to make an accounting. Make a
check or "x" on the line in front of the statement that
expresses your intent.)
20001 1165
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My attorney-in-fact need not render an accounting unless I
request it or the accounting is otherwise required by
Minnesota Statutes, section 523.21.
My attorney-in-fact must reder
(Monthly, Quarterly, Annual)
accountings to me or
(Name and Address)
during my lifetime, and a final accounting to the personal
representative of my estate, if any is appointed, after my
death.
In Witness Whereof I have hereunto signed my name this day
of
(Signature of Principal)
(Acknowledgment of Principal)
STATE OF MINNESOTA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF )
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
day of ,by
(Insert Name of Principal)
(Signature of Notary Public
or other Official)
This instrument was Specimen Signature of
drafted by: Attorney(s)-in-Fact
(Notarization not required)
Subd. 2. FAILURE TO CHECK OR "X" A POWER. Any of the
powers of the form in subdivision 1 which is not checked or
X-ed is withheld by the principal from the attorney-in-fact
unless the power of (N) of the form in subdivision 1 is checked
or X-ed.
Subd. 3. REQUIREMENTS. To constitute a "statutory
short form power of attorney," as this phrase is used in this
1166 [Vol. 27:2
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chapter the wording and content of the form in subdivision 1
must be duplicated exactly and with no modifications, parts
First, Second, and Third must be properly completed, and the
signature of the principal must be acknowledged. Failure to
name a successor attorney-in-fact, to provide an expiration
date, or to complete part Fourth does not invalidate the power
as a statutory short form power of attorney. A power of
attorney that does not satisfy the requirements of this
subdivision, but purports to be a statutory short form power of
attorney, may constitute a common law power of attorney that
incorporates by reference the definitions of powers contained
in section 523.24; however, a party refusing to accept the
authority of the common law attorney-in-fact is not liable un-
der section 523.20.
Subd. 3a. LEGAL DESCRIPTION. Use of a street address
instead of a legal description under the power of (A) in part
First of the statutory short form power of attorney invalidates
the power of (A) for all real property transactions, but does
not affect the powers of (B) to (M), nor does it affect the
power of (N) except with respect to real property transactions.
Subd. 4. POWERS OF ATTORNEY-IN-FACT. All powers
enumerated in section 523.24 may be legally performed by an
attorney-in-fact acting on behalf of a principal.
Subd. 5. REIMBURSEMENT OF ATrORNEY-IN-FACT. The
attorney-in-fact acting under a statutory short form power of
attorney is authorized to reimburse the attorney-in-fact for
expenditures the attorney-in-fact has made on behalf of the
principal even if the principal has not authorized the
attorney-in-fact to receive transfers directly under part
Third. In the event a reimbursement is made, the
attorney-in-fact shall render an accounting in accordance with
section 523.21.
HIST: 1984 c 603 s 25; 1986 c 444; 1992 c 548 s 21-25; 1995 c
130 s 9; 1998 c 254 art 1 s 107
Copyright 2000 by the Office of Revisor of Statutes, State of Minnesota.
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